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Abstract 
Binary judgement on under-informative utterances (e.g. Some horses jumped over the fence, 
when all horses did) is the most widely used methodology to test children’s ability to generate 
implicatures. Accepting under-informative utterances is considered a failure to generate 
implicatures. We present off-line and reaction time evidence for the Pragmatic Tolerance 
Hypothesis, according to which some children who accept under-informative utterances are in 
fact competent with implicature but do not consider pragmatic violations grave enough to 
reject the critical utterance. Seventy-five Dutch-speaking four to nine-year-olds completed a 
binary (Experiment A) and a ternary judgement task (Experiment B). Half of the children who 
accepted an utterance in Experiment A penalised it in Experiment B. Reaction times revealed 
that these children experienced a slow-down in the critical utterances in Experiment A, 
suggesting that they detected the pragmatic violation even though they did not reject it. We 
propose that binary judgement tasks systematically underestimate children’s competence with 
pragmatics. 
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1. Introduction 
According to Grice (1975 [1989]), interlocutors are expected to adhere to the Cooperative 
Principle and a set of maxims that makes their conversation as efficient as possible. 
Cooperative speakers will comply with the Maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and 
Manner, which enjoin them to say no more and no less than what is needed, to be truthful, 
relevant, concise and unambiguous. In this paper we will focus on the development of 
children’s competence with the Maxim of Quantity and especially its first sub-maxim, which 
prescribes speakers to make their contribution as informative as is required.  
Numerous studies in the field of pragmatics report that children are less competent using this 
maxim to derive pragmatic inferences (known as implicatures) than adults. In a high-profile 
paper that summarizes the emerging findings, Noveck and Reboul (2008) describe the 
development of informativeness as moving from broad semantic interpretations to narrowed 
pragmatic interpretations. The statement some apples are in the basket simply means that two 
or more apples are in the basket. A narrowed interpretation based on the Maxim of Quantity 
involves the evaluation of the speaker’s intentions and of other, more informative options: 
what was said, and what else could have been said? If all apples were in the basket, then a 
cooperative speaker would have stated the more informative proposition by saying all apples 
are in the basket. Therefore, the fact that they did not use the more informative proposition 
(assuming that they could have done so) suggests that this is not the case. In the case at hand, 
the hearer may reason that by only saying some apples the speaker also implies that ‘not all’ 
of the apples are in the basket. This interpretation is typically known as a quantity 
implicature. Moreover, because the implicature involves expressions that can form a scale of 
informativeness (like ‘some and all), it is further known as a scalar implicature (see Geurts 
2010).  
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In terms of child development, Noveck (2001) used a binary judgement paradigm, where 
participants are presented with an under-informative statement and are asked to make a binary 
judgement in terms of truth or falsity (or correctness, in other studies). Noveck (2001) found 
that 8- and 10-year-old children were not rejecting a sentence with a weaker term on a scale in 
favour of the more informative term. For example, the children judged sentences like some 
giraffes have long necks as true, despite the fact that all giraffes have long necks. Importantly, 
these children did not have problems rejecting sentences in general, as they were adult-like at 
rejecting sentences that were logically false. Papafragou and Musolino (2003), who also used 
a binary judgement paradigm, tested 5-year-old children’s performance on quantified, 
numerical, and verbal scales, and found that children predominantly accepted under-
informative statements. Training and explicit instruction improved the children’s 
performance, increasing the success on the numerical scales (but not the quantified or verbal 
ones) to a near-ceiling 90%. Feeney and colleagues (2004) found that manipulation of the 
relevance of the implicature also enhances rejections in 7-year-olds. Guasti and colleagues 
(2005) studied children’s pragmatic competence further in line with Papafragou and 
Musolino’s (2003) training and explicit instructions. They found that the performance of 7-
year-olds did improve, but that the effect did not persist over a longer period of time. Barner, 
Brooks and Bale (2011) and Papafragou and Tantalou (2004) also used binary judgements 
and further demonstrated that children’s performance does not differ when other types of 
under-informative sentences are tested (e.g., when the sentence the cow and the dog are 
sleeping describes a situation where a cat is sleeping as well). Foppolo, Guasti and Chierchia 
(2012) demonstrated the role of different lexical choices (partitive vs. non-partitive 
quantifiers) and the salience of the more informative expression that was not used (e.g. all), 
while Skordos and Papafragou (2016) demonstrated the role of contextual relevance of the 
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more informative expression, in both cases by studying children’s rates of rejection of under-
informative utterances. 
These and other papers have significantly advanced our understanding of the factors that are 
relevant when children (and adults) decide how to judge the felicity of an under-informative 
utterance. What is important for the present investigation is that these studies base their 
conclusions on the assumption that the children who accept under-informative utterances 
altogether lack (some or all of the) competence that is needed to generate implicatures. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to review exactly what kind of competence children who 
accept under-informativeness lack (this is a theory-critical matter which has generated a lot of 
attention and some controversy, see Katsos 2014). What we highlight is that they all assume 
that these participants lack some kind of competence and that this prevents them from 
generating implicatures. 
However, Davies and Katsos (2010), Katsos and Smith (2010), and Katsos and Bishop (2008, 
2011) have argued that children’s acceptance of under-informative sentences may have a 
different origin. Katsos and Bishop (2011) used a ternary task in addition to a binary task, and 
found that children were much more reluctant to endorse under-informative sentences in the 
former compared to the latter. That is, while 5-year-old children accepted under-informative 
utterances when given a binary choice (to decide if the utterance was right or wrong), they 
penalised the utterances in a ternary scale (to decide whether to award a small, medium or 
large strawberry), by giving the medium or the small rather than the top award. This finding 
gave rise to the Pragmatic Tolerance Hypothesis: children are sensitive rather than blind to 
violations of the Maxim of Quantity, but they do not always take the violation as severe 
enough to warrant a downright rejection of the critical sentence. Once children are tested in a 
paradigm that does not require them to demonstrate their competence by the categorical 
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rejection of pragmatically infelicitous sentences, then children’s true competence may be 
evident at ages much younger than the ones tested up to now. 
Katsos and Bishop (2011), and Katsos and Smith (2010), who reached similar conclusions, 
tested two different groups of 5-year-old children: one that was given a binary judgement 
task, and one that was given a ternary judgement task. Davies and Katsos (2010) tested 
sensitivity to over- and under-informativeness with a binary and a graded judgement task 
within the same groups of participants, and showed that children who seemed insensitive in 
the binary task did display sensitivity in the graded task.  
 In this paper, we have two aims: First, we aim to replicate the evidence in support of 
the Pragmatic Tolerance Hypothesis by using a binary and graded judgement task within the 
same group of participants with a new set of stimuli, ad hoc scales. We propose the 
developmental hypothesis that children are competent with implicature, and by extension, 
with some crucial aspects of Gricean pragmatics, at a much younger age than previously 
considered. This is anticipated by several studies in word-learning and mutual exclusivity, 
which propose that children as young as two years old employ Gricean-like principles to infer 
the likely referent of a novel word (see Clark 1990, among others; for an opposite view of 
children’s competence with mutual exclusivity, see De Marchena et al. 2011).  
Second, we wish to advance our understanding of the process through which pragmatically 
competent children tolerate pragmatically under-informative sentences. Currently, there is 
ample evidence that when participants are rejecting under-informative sentences, they require 
more time to do so than when rejecting logically false ones. Relevant data were first presented 
by Noveck and Posada (2003), who looked at reaction times to under-informative statements 
in adults. Similar data are reported by Bott and Noveck (2004) and De Neys and Schaeken 
(2007). The studies by Noveck and colleagues also report that rejecting under-informative 
sentences tends to take more time than accepting them.  
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In contrast, Feeney and colleagues (2004) found longer reaction times for adult participants 
accepting under-informative sentences than rejecting them . They claim that this longer 
reaction time is due to the reflective process of generating the pragmatic interpretation of an 
utterance and then inhibiting it to revert to the logical interpretation. A positive correlation 
between acceptances of under-informativeness and success in a counting span task led them 
to conclude that sufficient cognitive capacity is needed to cancel the implicature. 
Thus, the findings from the adult studies seem to be in direct contrast with each other, or to 
potentially stem from different sources. As discussed in Noveck and Reboul (2008), the 
studies by Noveck and colleagues as well as the dual task experiment in the De Neys and 
Schaeken (2007) suggest that in terms of working memory, generating pragmatic inferences is 
a resource-consuming process. In contrast, the studies by Feeney and colleagues suggest that 
it is the reflective un-doing of pragmatic inferences that requires superior working memory 
resources.  
Where does Pragmatic Tolerance fit in with these hypotheses? First of all, the major 
prediction of the Pragmatic Tolerance Hypothesis is that, even when pragmatically competent 
participants accept under-informative utterances, their acceptance should take more time than 
the acceptance of fully informative utterances (e.g. some elephants have trunks vs. some 
elephants live in zoos). This delay would be a reflection of the fact that participants have 
detected that the under-informative sentences violates the Maxim of Quantity, whereas no 
such violation is present in the fully informative cases. This prediction has not been the focus 
of previous work, and it is the minimum one would expect if the hypothesis on Pragmatic 
Tolerance is on the right track.  
This leads to different predictions for children who are pragmatically tolerant than for 
children who are indeed not competent with implicature. We have predicted that children who 
are not competent with implicature altogether will accept under-informative sentences in a 
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binary judgement task. They will also rate these sentences optimally in a ternary paradigm, 
since to them under-informative sentences are as felicitous as straightforwardly pragmatically 
appropriate sentences. Consequently, the reaction times for judging under-informative and 
fully informative sentences in the binary judgement task will be comparable. For 
pragmatically tolerant children, on the other hand, who accept under-informativeness in a 
binary setting, we predict that they show sensitivity to under-informativeness in a ternary 
judgement task by not awarding the top reward. Moreover, the reaction times in the binary 
judgement task ought to be longer for accepting under-informative sentences as compared to 
accepting logically true sentences (which would reflect the fact that they detected that the 
sentence was infelicitous, even though they accepted the sentence in the binary judgement 
task). These predictions are shown in Table 1. 
 








RT in the Binary Task 
1 Not competent  
in some respect 
Accept Top reward Acceptance of under-informative ≈ 





Acceptance of under-informative > 





Rejection of under-informative >  





Rejection of under-informative > 
Acceptance of under-informative  




Acceptance of under-informative > 
Rejection of under-informative 
 
Note: Predictions 1–3 stem from the Pragmatic Tolerance Hypothesis. Prediction 4a follow Bott and Noveck (2004), Noveck 
and Possada (2003), and De Neys and Schaeken (2004), whereas 4b is predicted by Feeney et al. (2004). 
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In the current study, informativeness was operationalised in a design where different objects 
or animals were inside a basket or on a sofa. This allowed us to create fully informative or 
under-informative sentences by using the same linguistic materials (noun phrases), but 
varying whether the sentence made mention of just one or all of the objects or animals. 
Therefore, under-informative utterances (e.g. in the basket there is a shoe in a display with a 
shoe and a ball inside a basket) would give rise to quantity implicatures based on an ad hoc 
scale, of the sort tested in Katsos and Smith (2010), Katsos and Bishop (2011), and Barner, 




Seventy-five neuro-typical children from primary school “de Sprankel” in Stiens, the 
Netherlands, took part in this study. The children were all native speakers of Dutch, and they 
received stickers for their participation. Their ages range between 4;0 and 9;8 (μ = 6;3). There 
were 32 boys. 
2.2 Materials and Procedure 
2.2.1 Experiment A 
The binary judgement task was designed in E-Prime and administered on a Sony laptop. First, 
the participants are introduced to a game by a fictional character who explains that the 
participants are going to see pictures which she will try to describe in the best possible way. 
The pictures show a basket with several objects inside and outside of it. The object were: bal 
(ball), schoen (shoe), bloem (flower), beer (bear), schaar (scissors), trein (train), pet (cap), kat (cat), 
banaan (banana), boek (book), hoed (hat), and klok (clock). 
Except for the teddy bear, banana, and cat, used only in the practice items, the object labels 
were all monosyllabic and the entities depicted were all inanimate. The participants were 
asked to indicate on a SR serial response box whether or not they thought the fictional cartoon 
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character described the picture correctly. They had to press the green button (correct) or the 
red button (incorrect) as quickly as possible. Responses and reaction times were registered, 
with reaction times being measured from the point where the pre-recorded sentence ended 
until one of the buttons was pushed. While the sentence was played, an empty basket was 
shown on the screen. The corresponding picture was presented immediately after the 
sentence, so that the reaction times measured the exact time it took to look at the objects and 
make a decision about the sentence. Pictures and recorded sentences were divided into five 
conditions (see Table 2). There were eight items in each condition, which were presented in 
random order.  
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Table 2. Conditions in the binary judgement task 
 
In the basket, there is a…  
shoe True (1 object) 
ball False (1 object) 
 
shoe and a ball True (2 objects) 




2.2.2 Experiment B 
The ternary judgement task was created on the same principles as the binary judgement task. 
The participants were introduced to the game by the same girl. She informed the participants 
that she liked strawberries and that in this game, the participants should reward her with a 
small strawberry, a medium-sized strawberry, or a large one, in correspondence to how well 
they thought her sentence described the picture. The participants should always give her at 
least the smallest strawberry. This 3-point rating scale (see also Katsos & Bishop 2011) is 






Figure 1. The 3-point rating scale from the ternary judgement task 
 
The pictures in the graded judgement task showed a sofa on which various cartoon animals 
were sitting. Except for the rabbit and the two deer used only in the practice items, all animal 
labels were monosyllabic: konijn (rabbit), hertjes (deer, plural), geit (goat), gans (goose), 
slang (snake), muis (mouse), kat (cat), beer (bear), leeuw (lion), hond (dog), aap (monkey), 
kip (chicken), and koe (cow). All materials are available from the authors upon request. 
The participants had to indicate which strawberry they would reward on an SR serial response 
box, where the leftmost button corresponded with the small strawberry, the middle button 
with the medium one, and rightmost button with the large strawberry. An example sheet 
showing the strawberries (Figure 1) was always visible. The items were again divided into 
five conditions, similar to the binary judgement task. There were eight items in each 
condition, which were presented at random. 
Testing took place in a quiet room at the children’s school. All participants started with the 
binary judgement task, which took about five minutes. The children then performed another 
set of tasks that was part of another investigation and lasted around 20 minutes. This interval 
was intended to take the children’s attention away from the specifics of the task. After the 
interval, the participants continued with the graded judgement task, which took also about 
five minutes. The session took in total around 30 minutes, after which the children were 





3.1 Behavioural results 
3.1.1 Experiment A 
In the binary judgement task, the participants had to press either a green or a red button as 
quickly as possible when they thought the sentence was right or wrong, respectively. The 
children were more or less at ceiling for accepting the true and rejecting the false conditions, 
see Figure 2: 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of correct responses in the different conditions. The number in 
parentheses refers to the number of objects in the display. Note that in this paper, we label the 
rejection of an under-informative statement as a correct response. 
 
Of all under-informative items, 50.3% were accepted, with a large variation (SD = 41.4%). 
Looking at the number of items that each child accepted (out of 8), we see that the majority 
either never accepted under-informative sentences, or always accepted them, see Figure 3: 
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Figure 3. Distribution of acceptances of under-informative statements 
  
Out of the 75 participants, 22 participants never accepted under-informative statements, 
whereas 20 participants always accepted them. Based on the results from the binary 
judgement task, one could conclude that there is a clear-cut distinction between children, with 
some being consistently competent with implicature (n = 22), some being in transition (n = 
33), and some consistently (apparently) lacking competence with implicature (n = 20). Such 
interpretations for this kind of data are consistently found in the literature (see, e.g., Guasti et 
al. 2005). 
 
3.1.2 Experiment B 
In the graded judgement task, the same participants rewarded sentences with a large, medium, 
or small strawberry (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. The distribution of small, medium, and large strawberries awarded in each of the 
different conditions. The number in parentheses refers to the number of objects in the display. 
 
True statements in the (1) or (2) items conditions were rewarded mostly with the top reward 
(large strawberry), whereas false statements in the (1) or (2) items conditions almost never 
received the top reward. However, no clear strategy is seen for the under-informative 
condition. An important question is how the twenty (allegedly not competent) participants 
who accepted the under-informative statements in the binary judgement task in Experiment A 
performed in the ternary judgement task. Figure 5 shows that of these 20 children, seven 
children gave the top reward as a reward for all under-informative sentences, whereas six 




Figure 5. Distribution of under-informative statements that were rewarded with the top 
reward (large strawberry) by the twenty participants who accepted all statements in the binary 
task 
 
These results indicate that seven participants in our study were oblivious to pragmatics (and 
four more participants also mostly gave the top reward for under-informative statements). 
However, six participants never gave the top reward (and one more almost never gave the top 
reward), despite accepting under-informativeness in the binary judgement task. These latter 
children would have been (mis-)classified as lacking competence with implicature by the 
binary task alone, but show in the ternary task that they are actually able to detect and 
penalise pragmatic infelicity. 
 
3.2 Reaction times 
In the binary judgement task, Experiment A, reaction times (RTs) were recorded for the 
judgement. Responses that took longer than 10000 ms were removed (2.4% of the data). 




Figure 6. Average response times in the different conditions. The number in parentheses 
refers to the number of objects in the display. 
 
In general, participants took longer to respond to under-informative statements compared to 
true statements with one object (692 ms, t(1172) = 7.424, p < .001). They also took longer to 
respond to under-informative statements compared to false statements with one object (348 
ms, t(1132,135) = 3.735, p < .001). In addition, participants were faster to respond to true 
statements compared to false statements, both for single object displays (344 ms, t(1191) = -
4.025, p < .001) and double object displays (694 ms, t(1156) = -6.962, p < .001). Also, 
displays with one object were responded to faster compared to displays with two objects, both 
for true statements (238 ms, t(1181) = -2.8, p < .01) and false statements (588 ms, t(1166) = -
5.889, p < .001).  
The judgement data from Experiments A and B combined showed that some children were 
pragmatically tolerant rather than lacking competence. So first, we compare the RTs for 
under-informative items to true items (with one object) between the two groups (see Table 3). 
Note that the pragmatically tolerant group only includes children who accepted all under-
informative statements in the binary task, but never awarded them the top reward, a large 
strawberry. The non-competent group only includes children who accepted all under-
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informative statements in the binary task and always awarded them the top reward, a large 
strawberry in the ternary task. 
 
Table 3. Reaction times for the accepters of under-informative statements 
 Oblivious children Pragmatically tolerant 
children 
Mean RT for under-
informative 
2207 ms 2098 ms 
Mean RT for true (1 object) 2136 ms 1389 ms 
Independent samples t-test t(99) = 0.21; p = .83 t(54,6) = 3.05; p  < .01 
Note: For oblivious children, n = 7, for pragmatically tolerant children, n = 6. 
  
Table 3 shows that there was no difference in RT for the non-competent children between 
under-informative sentences and true sentences (with one object), confirming Prediction 1 
(see Table 1). In contrast, the pragmatically tolerant children showed a delay of on average 
709 ms in responding to under-informative sentences compared to true ones, confirming 
Prediction 2. This pattern is similar to that of the 22 children who were pragmatically 
competent in the binary task: they showed a 698 ms delay for under-informative sentences 
compared to true ones (t(283.9) = 4.347; p < .001), but note that they rejected the under-
informative sentences, rather than accepting them. 
Next, we compare the RTs for rejecting under-informative sentences with the RTs for 
rejecting false sentences (with one object) across pragmatically competent children. Rejecting 
an under-informative sentence took on average 2529 ms, whereas rejecting a false sentence 
(with one object) took on average 2191 ms. This delay was significant (338 ms, t(315.131) = 
2.181, p < .05), confirming Prediction 3. 
Finally, we compare the RTs for accepting under-informative sentences by pragmatically 
tolerant children with the RTs for rejecting under-informative sentences by the same children. 
Accepting under-informative statements took on average 2098 ms, whereas rejecting them 
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took on average 2519 ms, but this delay in rejection was not significant (420 ms; t(192) = 
1.65; p = .10), thus not confirming either Prediction 4a or 4b. 
 
4. Discussion 
The first objective of this study was to test whether evidence for Pragmatic Tolerance can be 
found with ad hoc scales within the same subjects. Is there a risk that a child will be labeled as 
lacking competence with quantity implicature in a binary judgement task, whereas that same 
child does show sensitivity in a ternary judgement task? Earlier research by Katsos and 
colleagues  (2008; 2010; 2011) suggested that this might be the case; yet, the hypothesis was 
tested on ad hoc scales between subjects, rather than within subjects. Our study shows that 
when the same children are tested in both paradigms, it turns out that some are pragmatically 
tolerant to under-informativeness and accept under-informative sentences in the binary task, 
but do not award them the highest reward in the ternary task. Out of the twenty children who 
accepted under-informative sentences, six were pragmatically tolerant, seven were indeed 
lacking competence, and seven more were in transition. 
The second objective of this study was to test the predictions that the Pragmatic Tolerance 
Hypothesis makes with regard to reaction times. This hypothesis proposes that while 
pragmatically tolerant children are competent with pragmatics, they do not think that 
violations of the Quantity Maxim are severe enough to reject the sentence. We therefore 
predicted that pragmatically tolerant children take longer to respond to under-informative 
sentences (for which an inference has to be made) compared to logically true sentences (for 
which no additional inference is needed). Indeed, we found a significant delay for accepting 
under-informative sentences. We also predicted that children who lack competence do not 
differentiate between under-informative sentences (which are logically correct) and 
informative, true sentences. In line with the predictions, these RTs did not differ. 
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We also investigated whether it is the generation of an implicature or rather the cancellation 
of an implicature that requires the most time and resources. If the generation of an implicature 
is the most costly, rejections of under-informative sentences should be delayed compared to 
acceptances. On the other hand, if the cancellation of an implicature is the most costly, 
acceptances of under-informative sentences should be delayed compared to rejections. As our 
results showed no difference between RTs of rejections and acceptances, the current study 
cannot answer this question. 
Although most of the control conditions in our study yielded clear results, the false condition 
with two objects seemed to behave differently: it had the highest error rates in the binary task, 
received many more medium-sized strawberries than the other false condition in the ternary 
task, and yielded the longest RTs. This pattern was mainly due to the relationship between the 
sentence and the picture: the picture shows a basket with a ball and a shoe, whereas the 
sentence mentions a shoe and a hat. Although this statement as a conjunction is wrong, part of 
it is correct (i.e. there is a shoe in the basket). This might lead to confusion (higher error rates 
and longer RTs) because it is partly true, which explains why it received the medium-sized 
strawberry quite often. No such confusion was present for the true conditions, which were 
always completely true, or for the false condition with one object, which was completely 
false. 
The Pragmatic Tolerance Hypothesis assumes a developmental trajectory of pragmatic 
competence starting from pragmatically oblivious, via pragmatically tolerant, to pragmatically 
competent. Although the number of children in each group in our study is very small because 
of our strict categorization (and the differences are not statistically supported), the oblivious 




Figure 7. Average age for each of the pragmatic competence categories  
  
Thus far, it is unclear whether each child goes through a pragmatically tolerant stage and why 
(although there are reports of adults being pragmatically tolerant, we believe those are task 
effects, rather than a developmental stage in their pragmatic competence, e.g. Katsos & 
Bishop 2011). If one assumes that pragmatic competence comes with increased cognitive 
resources, it could be argued that the pragmatically tolerant children use these resources to 
both derive implicatures and adapt to their still pragmatically oblivious peers who cannot be 
expected to take into account the Gricean maxims. Another possibility is that these increased 
resources are still limited, therefore only used when the task demands it (as in a ternary 
judgement task) and not when a logical answer is sufficient (as in a binary judgement task). 
Future research might include a longitudinal study to shed more light on the development of 
pragmatic tolerance. 
Finally, we conclude this paper with a word of caution on the use of binary judgement tasks 
for the study of pragmatic competence. Without singling out any specific study, it is fair to 
say that to date binary judgement tasks are used routinely as if the methodology is a tried and 
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tested one for studying pragmatics in general, and implicature specifically. In the present 
paper we reported response accuracy and, for the first time, reaction time evidence, showing 
that this is not the case. Modifying judgement tasks to include a ternary as opposed to a binary 
response may be one suitable adaptation, while paradigms that do not involve passing a 
judgement at all, such as picture selection (Katsos & Bishop 2011, Experiment 3), eye- 
tracking (Huang & Snedeker 2009) or an action-based task (Pouscoulous et al. 2009), are 
among many other available solutions .  
We should clarify that we do not suggest that all research that has used the binary judgement 
task to date is deficient. To take a recent example, Skordos and Papafragou (2016) set out to 
investigate the role of the contextual relevance of the stronger alternative term. They found 
that 5-year old children’s rates of rejection of under-informative utterances were higher when 
the alternative is relevant for the context than when it is not. This is clear evidence for their 
hypothesized effect, and the fact that the evidence was demonstrated using a binary rather 
than any other measure (be it ternary judgement task, picture selection, eye-tracking, or 
action-based) is largely irrelevant. However, for studies that set out to investigate the age of 
acquisition of a certain competence or the presence or absence of competence in a certain 
population (such as in populations with Autism Spectrum Disorders), binary judgement tasks 
have the potential to substantially underestimate participants’ actual competence. 
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